SINGAPORE: The ASEAN-US Summit and the East Asia Summit will convene in Vientiane, Laos on Friday (Oct 11), but United States President Joe Biden will once again be absent.
For the second consecutive year, Biden has opted to send a representative in his place. This year, however, the level of representation has been further downgraded from Vice President Kamala Harris in 2023 to Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
While Biden’s absence may seem understandable given the demands of the upcoming Nov 5 presidential election, the reasons go beyond mere electoral necessity. The decision reflects a broader, more concerning trend in US foreign policy – one that signals a deprioritisation of Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
During the same period, Biden intended to travel to Germany and Angola to strengthen relations with allies and friends, according to a White House statement. This perceived diplomatic snub raises serious questions about Washington’s long-term commitment to ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific region.
As China’s influence continues to grow in Southeast Asia, the US’ inconsistent participation at these key forums again sends mixed signals.
This will undermine its strategic objectives and weaken its credibility in the region.
Despite Southeast Asia being frequently highlighted as a key pillar of the US Indo-Pacific strategy, Washington’s actions suggest that ASEAN continues to take a backseat in its broader geopolitical calculations.
An example is Biden’s decision to host the fourth Quad Leaders’ Summit in his hometown in Delaware, alongside the prime ministers of Australia, Japan and India.
This reflects the emphasis the US places on security-oriented alliances such as the Quad and the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US (AUKUS). Last month’s Joint Leaders Statement marking AUKUS’ third anniversary further underscores the US’ prioritisation of these exclusive, security-focused groupings over broader multilateral engagement with ASEAN.
The US has also strengthened trilateral cooperation in the region, mainly with like-minded partners.
Notable examples include the trilateral summit with Japan and South Korea in Camp David last year and the inaugural summit with Japan and the Philippines held in Washington in April this year. These groupings reflect the US’ broader strategy of forging coalitions with partners that align with its strategic objectives, primarily to counter China’s expanding influence in the region.
While regional security concerns, such as China’s increasing assertiveness and growing threats from North Korea, undoubtedly impact ASEAN countries, the grouping as a whole remains largely sidelined in US’ security considerations despite being at the heart of the Indo-Pacific.
Although the US frequently emphasises ASEAN centrality in its rhetoric, its actions often reveal a preference for smaller, exclusive groupings or bilateral ties with like-minded countries and viewing ASEAN through the lens of its strategic competition with China. As a result, many in the region are wary of the potential consequences.
While the State of Southeast Asia 2024 report shows that Southeast Asians may view the Quad as beneficial to the region, there are lingering and ingrained fears that such minilaterals undermine the centrality of ASEAN.
Source: CNA
